1 Introduction

1.1 In June 2002 the Isle of Wight Council held a Music Festival over a two-week period with particular emphasis on a high profile launch rock/pop concert.

1.2 The direct financial consequences of the Festival, ie ignoring the wider economic benefits of advertising and visitor spend, were estimated to be circa £20,000, with a cash flow subsidy of a maximum of £109,000 to be met temporarily from the reserves of Wight Leisure. In the event the costs to the Council of the Festival in total, including the launch event, were at least £330,000 with a further possible loss of £50,000 if a promised, but non contractual, sponsorship payment is not honoured.

1.3 The Council recently appointed a new Monitoring Officer, John Lawson, who inherited the fallout resulting from those heavy unexpected losses. Under the powers given to him as Monitoring Officer he initiated my Inquiry. My brief bona fides are attached as Appendix 1 In particular I am asked to consider inter alia :

A Whether the original November 2001 Executive report and accompanying Business Plan were demonstrably deficient.

B The extent of the Executive authorisation to contract for services to support the Festival, in particularly the ramifications of Clause 15, the so-called five year agreement, and whether that materially affected the options open to the Council.

C Whether sufficient controls were in place relating to the signing/sealing of contracts.

D Whether Elected Members were accurately briefed in the light of the contract and the financial position of the 2002 event.

E Whether press statements maintain an acceptable degree of accuracy.

F Whether any other matters of fact need to be reported or investigated.

1.4 I have not followed the above slavishly in what follows, but believe I have covered all these issues and more in the contextual thread of my Report.

1.5 The usual caveats are given, in that I have spent just four days on the Island with a further two days reading background material. I have not had time to question all interested parties or revisit interviewees as my knowledge increased. I have asked that all the individuals I spoke to (list at Appendix 2) are afforded the right to correct any factual errors I have made.

2 Formal Reporting

2.1 The concept of the Festival first emerged at the Economic Development, Planning, Tourism and Leisure Services Select Committee on 22 October 2001, although there had been some workshops in which some Members were involved, just prior to this. The report outlined how the Festival would contribute to the corporate objectives of the Council and a number of economic, artistic and regeneration strategies. It was felt important that because of the impact on a very wide range of Council aspirations that the Festival should not be looked at in purely commercial terms, but a detailed business plan would be drafted and thoroughly reviewed although an initial assessment showed the Festival could be self-financing in 3-5 years. The Select Committee recommended the Executive to support the concept of a two-week Jubilee Music Festival on the understanding that effective financial checks and balances were put in place.

2.2 Obviously the concept did not emerge from thin air, and I ascertained from Annie Horne that the gestation period started with informal discussions with a few interested Members in 1998. In the intervening period some structured, but intermittent, research was undertaken as time and resources allowed. The planning of the Queen’s Jubilee Celebrations galvanised the hitherto somewhat desultory discussions from mid 2001.

2.3 Some three weeks after the Select Committee, on 13 November 2001, a very full report to the Executive emerged. It is not just the benefit of hindsight that allows me to remark that in moving from concept to fully fledged business case in three weeks some heroic assumptions were being made, notwithstanding the fact that a measure of background work had been done before the October meeting. It certainly could not be the case that the “Business Plan would be thoroughly reviewed” as reported to the Select Committee.

2.4 Given the financial outcome, I concentrated on the financial implications of the report and that aspect of the Business Case which showed the potential deficit of £20,000 , with the very major assumption of launch event ticket sales of 15,000 which was described as a very conservative estimate. The financial implications section of the Report proper made no mention of any sort of risk analysis attached to the major assumptions in the Business Case appendix, but merely referred to how an expected temporary cash flow problem might be financed from Wight Leisure reserves.

2.5 I questioned the Director of Finance on what I would normally regard as a very deficient financial implications section and I found his response to be quite startling. Until the report arrived on his desk with literally a few hours before the report deadline he had not personally been aware of the existence of the proposed Music Festival. It is a moot point as to whether a report with a scheme of this magnitude should have been allowed to proceed without adequate financial and presumably corporate input. It certainly speaks volumes about the wider corporate working of the senior officers of the Authority at that time. The Directors Board agenda of 29 May 2002 made no mention of the Festival, by then just three days away, or of the expected financial losses. The minutes do not record any discussion under any other business. To be fair to the Director of Finance he obviously spelled out the potential financial risks at the meeting of the Executive itself; as the minutes record “Director of Finance informed Members of the potential financial risks that would be taken if the venture were given approval. It was stressed that the Council would have unlimited liability for all income and costs if the Festival was not the outstanding success that everyone hoped it would be”. From the wider Council Member perspective oral guidance at a meeting is obviously of less impact than the content of the report for decision.

2.6 It is clear that by November 2001 sufficient Members were being driven by the excitement of the revival of the Isle of Wight Music Festival, the time constraints imposed by the Jubilee date and the enormous amount of work that had to be done between November and June, not least the booking of the Artistes, and that excitement was having an effect on the behaviour of officers in the Leisure Services department. Members were also faced with reports which showed little financial risk. Sober reflection was not allowed and its absence not properly reported which is one of the lessons which must be learned from this episode. Given the wider economic benefits to the Island, especially in the medium term, Members might well have decided that Festival support of circa £300,000 would in any event have been justified, especially during a known lull in the tourist market, but the possibility of such losses should have been brought to their attention in the original report.

2.7 At the Economic Development, Planning, Tourism and Leisure Services Select Committee on 28 January 2002, Members were requested to nominate a representative to the Strategic Overview Management Group for the Festival. I can find no formal report setting up this Group. It was not in the November report to the Executive. The Management Group, according to the Select Committee report, “would review plans and progress and measure against the key milestones identified within the business plan. This will enable Members to identify any areas of concern at an early stage and identify any appropriate actions to be taken, including reporting back to the Select Committee or the Executive.”

2.8 From February 2002 on the Strategic Overview Management Committee met very regularly. The representation of the Group was widely drawn with representatives from all the political groupings including the local Ward Councillor for the launch concert site. If the 28 January Select Committee was the only formal reference to the Group, I do not believe it was properly constituted, although I have not had time to consider all the procedural rules and regulations of the Council. There were no formal powers of delegation or reference to any limit on their authority. It was supposed to refer back to the Select Committee or the Executive, as far as I can ascertain it never did, apart from an oral report in March to the Select committee, despite quite major changes to the original business case appendix in the November 2001 report. Nevertheless officers quite clearly took the Group as the formal reporting line and method of authorisation. Notwithstanding the wide-ranging representation and the undoubted pragmatic benefits of the Group, its formal relationships with the County Council’s formal structures was very sloppy indeed. Neither the Select Committee nor the Overview Group were decision making bodies of the Council, and the Executive meeting of November 2001 as minuted did not confer on these bodies or officers any delegated powers to take decisions. The Executive Committee of the 26^th. of February had a very short report suspending standing orders to allow the contract with Solo to be signed. There was no mention in their report or minutes to any other issues.

2.9 The reports to the Overview Group were frequent and detailed, there was every attempt made to keep Members aware of unfolding events, but this was a major learning experience for the officers with a very fast moving timetable and members could not really be expected to be on top of the situation at all times. What I find especially curious is that when it became obvious that substantial losses were likely to be incurred, as ticket sales for the launch event were falling well behind estimates, the decision to carry on because the likely cost of cancelling the concert heavily outweighed the costs of continuing, was taken by this informal Group without reference to the Select Committee or the Executive. Indeed there was no formal report back to the Executive until November 2002. It may be that the members of the Group relayed matters back to their colleagues in an informal way, but as I say the Group had no formal powers or budgetary delegation as far as I can ascertain. This collective failure to follow normal local authority due processes was not done to circumvent debate in any conscious sense, but I am sure the new Monitoring Officer will use the experience to obviate such criticisms in future.

3 The Original Business Case

3.1 I refer earlier to the very truncated timescale within which the original Business Case was prepared. Although I have some admiration for the quite wide-ranging content of the November 2001 report given that timescale, I do not think it is being wise after the event to say that it should have been perfectly obvious that any due diligence on the financial projections was severely limited.

3.2 The Authority’s Director of Finance played absolutely no part in drawing up the financial projections or checking their basis, and was presented with the figures literally hours before the report deadline. I think with the benefit of hindsight he would/should have reported the lack of due diligence notwithstanding his oral reference to unlimited liability at the Executive Committee. It may be of course that his oral references also included comments along these lines , but without his comments being fully minuted. Annie Horne made the point that it would have been difficult for the Director of Finance to comment " as we considered this project to require expertise in the music industry field" In other words even given time she might not have sought the advice of the Council's finance staff, not to be recommended in a well run organisation.

3.3 The officers of Wight Leisure who drew up the figures did their best in the timescale, but should have alerted members to the constraints on their efforts imposed by that timescale. Most of the expenditure budgets were reasonably adhered to with a few notable exceptions, the major one being artiste fees where changes were endorsed by the Members Overview Group. The actual sponsorship and franchise income was below expectation, but not disastrously so. The major failing was the significant over estimate of ticket sales. I have seen evidence that the figure of 15,000 was enthusiastically endorsed by the Wight Leisure advisers, Solo, and was backed up by them at informal meetings with both Members and officers. Nevertheless even in the very truncated timescales it would have taken moments to provide a table for Members showing the effects of ticket sales (say) at 1,000 steps from (say) 10,000 upwards. A very simple risk analysis which might have at least alerted Members to the broad extent of their liability. I am conscious that in the event sales were well below 10,000, but even as a Yorkshireman as well as an accountant and therefore a professional pessimist, faced with the evidence on which the officers were making their forecasts and the advice they were given, I would not have believed that sales would be as low as they turned out, given the line up. Indeed right up to the last two weeks, Solo were prepared to share any losses in return for a more secure, from their point of view, longer term relationship, such was their confidence in the festival. This emerged during my conversation with John Giddings of Solo, and may be of use during any further negotiations with Solo over future rights etc. ( see section 5 )

3.4 Even if Members had had a potential liability of circa £300,000 drawn to their attention, I reiterate I think the widespread support for the Festival by Members across the political spectrum and relevant community groups was such that the go ahead would have been given.

3.5 I have seen references to the incompetence of officers, which in the narrowest sense of the preparation of the Business Case I believe to be unfair, except in their failure to highlight the extent of their assumptions. I repeat the impossible timescale and that some quite difficult expenditure budgets were reasonably forecast. The major overspend on the Artistes’ fees being a deliberate decision taken in conjunction with Members, albeit in the flawed structural relationship I refer to in the previous section, to beef up the attraction of the launch event. The significant net loss was overwhelmingly due to the poor attendance which I again repeat given the line up was affected in part by events of which officers were not aware at the time of the original report (see section 6). I am critical of the way the officers did not bring to Members’ attention the potential downside, and I am critical of the way the matter was not brought to or discussed at the Directors Board. I can well understand the Directors' view that they were bounced by a very late report which they had had no input to, either collectively or individually, but they had a duty to say so, at the Executive. Similarly Annie Horne, despite undoubtedly being of the view that nobody at Director level was interested (see below), should have forced the matter on to the Directors Board agenda. This may be described as incompetence, but I believe it was more a reflection of how the corporate culture of the Council was lacking in relation to a major part of the County Council, viz Leisure and Tourism. Annie makes the point that her reporting line was through the Head of Community Development to the Director of Education and that it was not her function to put matters to the Board. I believe this reinforces my point.

3.6 I believe a critical contributor to this corporate failure was the manner in which Wight Leisure had been pushed from pillar to post during successive and quite frequent organisational reviews. At the time of the original reports in October/November 2001, the then Chief Executive was relinquishing oversight of the leisure department and was “parking” it, his term, with the Head of Community Development through whom, but not to whom, the Managing Director of Wight Leisure would report. This was later corrected and more formal arrangements put in place, but nobody with a seat at the top table was taking ownership or responsibility for Wight Leisure’s activities at a critical period and I believe the situation remains confused. Throughout the period from 1998 onwards, no Director was interested in, or indeed aware of, the Music Festival, this may have suited Wight Leisure in many ways, but it certainly was not conducive to the good of the Council.

4 The Relationship with Solo

4.1 During the run up to the October/November member reports Annie Horne and her staff contacted numerous organisations thought to be of sufficient standing to help, advise, and promote the launch concert. I have seen evidence to support this. This is not a market place with which I am familiar, but both Annie Horne and John Giddings independently advised me that there are possibly four to six organisations who could take on the organisation of a pop concert of the scale envisaged. Annie Horne asserts that she contacted all the organisations who might be capable with only Solo responding in any positive fashion.. John Giddings asserts in turn that he only responded positively because of his partner’s former resident status on the Island.

4.2 Solo were involved quite early in the Autumn of 2001 with both members and officers in drawing up the plans for the launch concert. I have no criticism of the selection of Solo as a partner. Clearly the necessary expertise did not reside in the leisure department. What should have been apparent from the outset however, given the size of the fee envisaged, is that the potential appointment of Solo would require the exemption from widely known Contract Standing Orders whereby the normal tendering mechanisms would not operate, and on the quite reasonable grounds that Solo had in effect picked themselves given the lack of response. This was belatedly realised just as the contract was about to be signed in February 2002, but was another example of time pressures leading to sloppy process.

4.3 The actual working relationship leading up to the concert appeared to work reasonably well given the lack of relevant experience by Council staff in this area and the completely different cultures of the two organisations. Both sides in my interviews with them were critical of the shortcomings of the other, and both cited examples of where they believed they had not received the assistance they expected. In the first year of operation this was probably only to be expected, indeed given the fraught last few weeks before the Festival, by when it was obvious that there could be a significant financial shortfall, it is testimony to the relationships which had built up, that the two sides continued to work positively together.

5 The Contract with Solo and Clause 15 (Renewal Rights)

5.1 The renewal clause in the first draft contract stated that “if the Council decides by the end of September 2002 that the Concert should become an annual event, the Council will give Solo the first option to renew this contract subject to both parties deeming the working relationship in 2002 successful. If this contract is renewed the fees payable will be revised commensurate with the scale of the event proposed”. At the outset of the contract negotiations (mid February 2001) it was clear via file notes on the draft contract that it was the clear intention of officers that the contract would revert to the Council each year for approval. There was a draft contract in existence on 21 February 2002 to this effect. There are also file notes to the effect that if contracts were not signed by the end of February the Festival could not proceed, not least because of the booking of artistes. In other words officers were again right up against time barriers. On 25 February Solo’s lawyers responded with “if at any time during the next five years the Council decides to repeat the Concert (or hold a similar event), the Council undertake and agree that they will give Solo the first option to review this agreement. If this agreement is reviewed the fees payable will be revised commensurate with the scale of the event proposed, the fees charged for this concert and the other relevant matters.”

5.2 There is then an e-mail from the Head of Legal Services, Peter Pilgrem, to Annie Horne … Clause 15 – “they have made the option to renew for five years, is that acceptable and do you have or need Member agreement to that length of time. Or do you want to cut it down to one year again? As now worded it is an option we must give them, ie if we decide to hold another concert and they want to do it we must contract with them – no let out.” I found it strange that the Council’s Head of Legal Services was asking whether member agreement was necessary. I am not a lawyer but common sense dictates their endorsement.

5.3 There follows a cryptic file note from Annie Horne “Bring to one unless fees higher. Any further offer of Council continuing with Festival has to go back to Executive for approval. We have made it clear we are working to a five year plan.” Annie interprets this for me as both her and the Head of Legal Services agreeing that as any proposal to carry on with the Festival would have to be referred back to the Executive and that as the contract was for "services" there was not a problem.

5.4 Peter Pilgrem then e-mailed Solo’s lawyers, again on 25 February, that the Council would allow the clause to stand “if we could add a provision that your clients would not organise any other open air concert subject to the Isle of Wight Act during the same period without the consent of the Council”

5.5 What was eventually inserted into the contract was Clause 15 – if at any time during the next four years the Council decides to repeat the Concert (or hold a similar event) the Council undertakes and agrees they will give Solo the first option to renew this agreement. If this agreement is renewed, the fees payable will be revised commensurate with the scale of the event proposed, the fees charged for this Concert and any other relevant matters.

Clause 16 – In consideration of the grant of this option to renew this agreement Solo undertakes and agrees that for a period of 15 months following the concert or any repeat or similar concert at which it provides services in accordance with this agreement or any renewal of this agreement it shall not organise or be involved in any other open air concert which is subject to the Isle of Wight Act 1981 without the consent in writing of the Council.

5.6 Thus the significance of the five year renewal had been recognised and the possibility/probability of requiring Member approval to a five year deal. Peter Pilgrem’s recollection is that the contract was signed after 26 February Executive Committee, It is his recollection that he mentioned the significance of the five year clause to Members at that committee. This may well have been the case, but it was not minuted and giving a five year deal should have been reported to Members as his earlier e-mail alluded to, and that fact recorded. In a perfect world the Committee should also have been given other very relevant information such as the applicability of European legislation. Another example of time and enthusiasm leading to sloppy process.

5.7 Peter Pilgrem also mentioned that the wording was deliberately vague and his understanding was that if the Council contracted with anybody it would have to be with Solo, but they were not pre-empted from promoting the concert themselves.

5.8 I had quite a different interpretation of what clause 15 meant from John Giddings of Solo, who in conversation stated that he had, in his opinion, a lock tight agreement to promote similar concerts for the next five years and would not have invested in this year’s event if that were not the case. Furthermore if any music festival, including a one or two day rock concert were to be held in the near future, in which he was not involved, he would “fight it in the Courts”.

5.9 I am not a lawyer, but have discussed a number of possible scenarios with John Lawson, all of which might be arguable in a legal context. At this juncture all that can be said is that if Clause 15 has to be tested ever, it will be a messy and time consuming legal process.

5.10 The Council have a reasonable relationship with Solo, are currently negotiating future co-operation on further festivals, and given the fact that nobody else was interested in a start up situation and the Council clearly do not want to expose themselves to the same extent again, the existence of clause 15 was not properly authorised but is not now of massive consequence, as it will have to be renegotiated as part of the new deal.

5.11 During the summer and early autumn, the possible sale of “rights” came to assume an importance it did not deserve, but which I report because it illustrates very well another instance of the lack of effective communication between senior officers and Directors. When it became obvious that the Festival would lose money, one of the options put forward to mitigate that loss was the sale of rights. Sometimes this referred to the Festival with or without the launch concert and sometimes just to the launch concert itself. There were a number of e-mails flying around expressing incredulity that there was anything to sell eg: “one of the ways in which it had been hoped to recoup this year’s losses, was no longer a runner as they (the rights) had already been sold by Annie. This was a surprise to us all.” (9 October 2002).

5.12 When I questioned Annie Horne about her espousal of selling rights to the launch concert when Clause 15 had given five years rights to Solo she was most indignant. In her view the contract with Solo was a contract for services and the five year clause related to the provision of those services which were clearly spelled out in the contract. Furthermore the contract at paragraphs 2 and 3 states that “the Council possesses full ownership of the Isle of Wight Festival and has sole rights to it, … the agreement does not confer any rights on Solo in respect of the Festival.” This view appears to be backed up by Peter Pilgrem who was advising in May that the sale of any rights would be subject to contract standing orders. Thus he did not believe rights had been given away by the February contract, he must have concurred that the contract was for services only.

5.13 Nevertheless, this relatively simple misunderstanding was allowed to fester for several months, with a thinly disguised aura of mutual suspicion when simple conversations could have cleared the matter up.

5.14 This episode also reflects badly on the construction of the contract in that although it may be for services, with launch concert rights still available for sale, how anyone would want these rights when one of the services Solo have an exclusive right to is ”the recommendation of appropriate artistes/bands for the concert and will act as agents on behalf of the Council to approach, book and contract with such artistes/bands to performing at the concert within the launch budget”. In other words the arguments about lack of any saleable rights might have been right but for the wrong reasons. Certainly John Giddings did not believe there were any rights for sale.

5.15 Events have moved on, but what I took to be the aura of mutual suspicion I refer to during the very lengthy period before a formal report of the outcome of the Festival was produced, June to November,, should be eradicated as I detect it may well be poisoning the discussions in the run up to the outsourcing of Wight Leisure. In my experience an essential pre-requisite for any successful transfer such as the one envisaged is mutual respect and confidence, with all issues debated transparently and openly and with sufficient time to properly reflect on the most beneficial way forward. This comment is well outside my remit and is largely based on subjective rather than empirical evidence, and has to be judged in that light. Nevertheless, I believe both Members and officers should reflect on whether the transparency, openness and requisite time I refer to are representative of the situation as it currently exists.

6 Related Matters

6.1 The actual contract was signed by Chris Mathews, the Head of Democratic Services, but had clearly been signed off by Peter Pilgrem before this and I looked at the authorisation and the sealing book. There can be no criticism of this officer or the process.

6.2 Although somewhat tangential to my remit, during my perusal of the multitude of files from various parts of the organisation, I was struck by the strength of external support for the festival, both pre and post the event, and the relatively few complaints. I was also impressed by the detail and extent of the de-briefing and the wide ranging number of external agencies who contributed. There is a sound base of experience for future festivals.

6.3 The financial failure has obviously caused a great deal of angst and the causes have undoubtedly been chewed over in a multitude of conversations, although strangely again not in formal reports. There have also been references to particular issues in the local press. The reasons given to me were a mixture of bad luck and bad judgement (with perfect hindsight). The bad luck probably encompasses the Bowie fiasco, the late programmed but eventually very extensive Jubilee musical celebrations the same weekend. The bad judgements relate to, two days rather than one day festivals are more successful, bank holidays when transport and accommodation is full anyway are best avoided, and marketing and publicity for this type of event is best left totally to the Solos of this world.

6.4 I have made reference earlier that I believe Members may well have invested circa £300,000 in the event anyway, they made a similar contribution to the America’s Cup event, for the wider economic benefits it would bring. This does not excuse the poor reporting of possible downside risk, but helps to put the matter in context. The Council has a net budget of circa £130 million, I believe, and reserves of just under £2 million. The losses on this year’s festival are painful but not life threatening and if the negotiations with Solo are successful, there will be some reimbursement via the future years’ ticket sales.

6.5 I have seen extensive correspondence involving the District Auditor about the calculation of the benefits accruing from visitor spend and event related free advertisements. The press log was very well kept and very extensive, and there were undoubtedly visitor numbers measured in the thousands. What these benefits are worth is always in part subjective and the Leisure Department may be accused of spurious accuracy in the figures they have put out. Nevertheless they did use externally validated methods of calculating such benefits. For my part I would be content that there were substantial benefits to the wider Island economy, trying to agree what these were precisely eventually degenerates into the angels dancing on a pinhead scenario.

6.6 Solo are obviously very keen to promote the launch concert to the festival in future, which become very apparent to me when I was discussing what Clause 15 meant with their Managing Director John Giddings. As I do not think he is a noted philanthropist it can be presumed that he expects the investment in this year’s festival to bear fruit in future. In the November 2002 report, the Executive have authorised further negotiations with Solo, but on the basis that all risk and reward accrue to Solo, with the Council providing the site and infrastructure liaison in return for a ticket allocation. I believe this is the right direction; however streamlined the Council can legitimately make its decision processes they can never be as fleet of foot as the specialist entrepreneurs. If Mr Giddings is right, however, and he does make a killing in future years, the Council will undoubtedly be criticised for making the initial investment for someone else’s reward. It should be made clear when the current negotiations are reported back that Members are well aware of this possibility and took it into consideration when they opted out of the risk/reward scenario.

7 Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 I was not directed to and have not felt inclined to, regard my Inquiry as a witch hunt. I have been critical of the cavalier approach to the formal processes which are such an essential part of public sector organisations and especially so in a Local Authority context with a Leader/Cabinet model of operation. I have also been critical of the corporate working at the top of the organisation and the failure to temper majority Members’ clear wishes with all the factors they should take into account when making decisions, including the negative ones. I have undoubtedly been guilty of this personally many times in my career, but I hope it is not too hypocritical to ask relevant officers to reflect where their input could have been better.

7.2 On the other hand I was impressed by the enthusiasm and commitment of all the officers I spoke to; they may have played fast and loose with the rules on occasions, but their clear focus and energy was always for the good of the community as far as I can ascertain. The Festival itself was a failure in narrow financial terms, but that should not detract from the enormous and successful logistical effort that went in and which should form a sound base for future festivals.

7.3 I have just three recommendations for Members and the Directors Board to consider.

7.3.1 There was and maybe still is, a widespread misunderstanding about the formal decision making processes in a Leader/Cabinet model of operation. Officers were quite clearly treating the Select Committee and the Strategic Overview Committee as decision making Committees as under the previous Local Authority Committee system. The new Monitoring Officer should in my view undertake a widespread training exercise to explain in words of one syllable how the decision process works to all Members and the top layers of management of the Authority. During the course of this training for officers they might also be reminded of the old and ongoing requirement to include all relevant factors in a report.

7.3.2 The new Head of Paid Service should consider in the light of the failures in Senior Officer communications I refer to, how best to foster a more open and co-operative culture at the top of the organisation. The e-mail is now ubiquitous, but talking to each other is still a wonderful medium.

7.3.3 There is a danger of a “them and us” situation developing between Wight Leisure and the rest of the organisation. This needs stamping on before it significantly affects the success of the externalisation of Wight Leisure.

APPENDIX 1

NEIL NEWTON

Career

1991 - 1999	Managing Director and Director of Finance – London Borough Hammersmith and Fulham – Retired
1987 – 1991	Director of Project Finance - Prebone Yamane Plc
1980 – 1987	Director of Finance - London Borough of Bromley
1974 – 1980	Deputy County Treasurer - Northants CC
1972 – 1974	Director of Finance, Corby DC

Appointments Since Retirement

Chairman - London Pension Fund Authority

Chairman - Capital Fund Advisory Committee

Director - Greater London Enterprises

Technical Advisor - Veredus Executive Search and Selection

Local Government Advisor - Herbert Smith Lawyers (to 2001)

Assignments Since Retirement

Retained by the Mayor of London to advise on his organisational structure and first budget preparation.

Investigations into the Finance Departments of Nottingham and North Herts Councils.

The Government’s specialist advisor with Hackney LBC (ongoing).

Retained by ODPM to undertake a financial diagnostic into Hull City Council.

Retained by DfES to advise on the outsourcing of the Education Departments of Hackney and Walsall Councils.

Numerous CPA and CGI Inspections.

Qualifications

BA ECON Hons II I, Leeds University 1964

CIPFA Prizewinner 1967

APPENDIX 2

Councillor Mrs Shirley Smart Leader of the Council

Councillor Mrs Peggy Jarman Portfolio holder for Tourism and Leisure

Mike Fisher Head of Paid Service

John Lawson Head of Legal and Democratic Services

Annie Horne Managing Director – Wight Leisure

John Pulsford Director of Finance and Information

Chris Mathews Democratic Services Manager

John Giddings Managing Director Solo Enterprises (by phone)

Peter Pilgrem Ex Head of Legal Services